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Abstract Parallel trade (PT) is a phenomenon that takes place at the distribution level,
when a patented product is diverted from the official distribution chain to another one where
it competes as a parallel distributor. Although some research regards PT in Europe as a
‘common’ form of arbitrage, there are reasons to believe that it is a type of ‘regulatory
arbitrage’ that does not necessarily produce equivalent welfare effects. We draw upon a
unique dataset that contains source country records of parallel imported medicine sales to the
Netherlands for one therapeutic group (statins), that accounts for 5% of themarket at the time
of study and it faced no generic competition. We estimate precise differences in prices and
statutory distribution margins for each source country/product and, examine whether they
drive parallel import flows using a gravity specification and an instrumental variable strategy.
Our findings reveal that parallel imports are driven by cross-country differences in statutory
distribution margins in addition to price differences, consistently with the hypothesis of PT
being a type of ‘regulatory arbitrage’.
Keywords Parallel trade · Parallel imports · Regulatory arbitrage · Pharmaceuticals ·
Supply chain
JEL Classification I18 · L51
Introduction
In the European Union, medicines are regulated products subject to both single market and
country specific health care regulations (e.g., medicines pricing and distribution regulation).
This gives rise to parallel trade (PT), a phenomenon that takes place when a patented product
is diverted from the official distribution chain (the distribution channel chosen by the origi-
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nator) to another one in another European member state where it competes with the official
distribution chain as a parallel distributor. PT is a legal activity even though medicines are
products under the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). This is the case because
such IPR are subject to European-wide (as opposed to country wide) legal exhaustion after
first sale in an existing European member state. A patent does not confer legitimate control
of the product to the originator company upon sale in one-member state country. Hence, if
price differences arise across countries, a parallel distribution chain may well be developed
in higher price countries in response.
The consolidation of a single European market uncovers several opportunities for differ-
ent forms of arbitrage. Typically, ‘common arbitrage’ takes place when an agent profits from
product price differences across markets, which is expected to give rise to some form of price
equalisation between markets, namely a common price. However, when price differences
result from heterogeneous competitive conditions created from regulated prices (Costa-Font
et al. 2014, 2015), as well as country specific statutory margins, we refer to such a phe-
nomenon as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. In such a case, price equalisation is not guaranteed1, as
regulations result from country specific lobbying and pressure group capacities (Grossman
and Lai 2006).
A number of decisions adopted by the European Court of Justice have further encouraged
distributors to engage in parallel trade (Barfield andGroombridge 1998). However, this paper
does not attempt to examine the effects of parallel trade legislation, nor offer a state of the art
of European parallel trade policy. Instead, we attempt to contribute to the literature by pro-
viding a different interpretation of how European PT should be regarded from an economics
standpoint. More specifically, we examine here the extent to which parallel trade (PT) flows
are driven by distribution chain regulations (and especially country specific statutory mar-
gins) rather than other factors including (unregulated) price differences which would drive
more ‘common forms of arbitrage’ (Mauleg and Schwartz 1994; Richardson 2002; Jelovac
and Borodoy 2005; Pecorino 2002). ‘Clean evidence’ that establishes the impact of distribu-
tion regulation is rare insofar as it requires access to source country data, and merge it with
data on country specific statutory distribution margins (determining the profitability of the
parallel trade business)2.
We empirically document whether European medicines parallel trade (PT) falls, at least
partially, in the ‘regulatory arbitrage’ category.We add to the literature by taking advantage of
a unique proprietary dataset (IntercontinentalMedical Statistics, IMS) containing information
on the source country of PT flows. Thus, we can compute for each product in the therapeutic
group the exact price difference at the point of distribution. In addition, by identifying the
destination and source countries, it is possible to match for each product/country the statutory
distribution margins (that are added to the price3, which in turn provides a conservative
estimate of the potential gain from PT given the potential presence of rebates and discounts
which are not observed).Weuse data on parallel imports for cholesterol drugs fromasmany as
1 The term ‘regulatory arbitrage’ is not specific to the pharmaceutical industry regulation. Typically, in
other industries, that term is applied when a bank changes its charter from a state bank to a national bank to
take advantage of different regulatory treatment, or when a firm changes its country of headquarters to take
advantage of different tax regimes.
2 Parallel imports may well be the effect of second degree price discrimination, for example resulting from
discounts given by parallel distributors to pharmacists in importing countries (Anderson and Ginsburgh 1999).
3 This paper fills this gap by using a unique dataset, which contains a rich set of controls for the regulation
of the distribution chain. This is especially important given that identifying bilateral trade flows allows us to
ascertain the magnitude of the effect of economic arbitrage (price differences between country of origin and
destination) vis a vis distribution chain regulatory differences.
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eight European source countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
and the UK), which in our dataset are found to distribute up to 95% of all observable parallel
imported statins to the Netherlands across 24 quarters (1997–2002).
Previous studies have either failed to precisely identify the product origin, or have not
taken into account the presence of generic drug penetration (Kanavos et al. 2008; Costa-
Font et al. 2014, 2015). Furthermore, the theoretical literature remains inconclusive about
the capacity of parallel trade to increase the country’s welfare (Mauleg and Schwartz 1994;
Richardson 2002). That is, the normative implications for welfare of parallel trade expansion
are ambiguous and tightly dependent on the welfare effects of a common price as compared
to price discrimination equilibrium. Furthermore, previous empirical studies are limited by
the wide therapeutic heterogeneity. This paper overcomes some of the limitations of previous
studies.
Unlike previous empirical studies, our estimates are from a flexible augmented gravity
specification of trade (import) flows that contains rich information on the heterogeneity
of the supply chain regulation (more specifically retail and wholesale regulation). We can
distinguish distribution chain regulation effects and we are able to estimate the volume of
PT medicines in one country (the Netherlands) for a given therapeutic group from a given
quarter. PT flows are modelled as a function of relative product prices (consistently with
any form of arbitrage) and country specific wholesale regulations (specific of regulatory
arbitrage), exchange rates (which is a variable that we separate from relative price to capture
the adoption of a common currency in the period), and other covariates that are commonly
employed in gravity specifications of trade such as geographical distance, and three different
transformations of GDP (difference in GDP per capita, sum of GDP, relative GDP).
Our findings are consistentwith the hypothesis ofmedicines’ parallel trade (imports) being
an economic activity driven by cross-country differences in statutory distribution margins .
An extension of the statutory margins can act as an incentive for PT even after controlling by
medicines prices. The latter is (suggestive of and) consistent with the hypothesis of regulatory
arbitrage as statutory distribution margins are determined by country regulation, which is
specific of each country.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In “Background” section provides the paper
background. In “Data andEmpirical Strategy” section presents themethodology, data sources
and empirical strategy, while “Results” section reports the results and discusses them. Finally,
“Conclusion” section outlines the main conclusions.
Background
Conceptual considerations
While PT is conceptualised in the theoretical literate as a ‘common’ form of arbitrage,
predictions of arbitrage theory do not seem to be backed by empirical evidence (Kanavos
and Costa-Font 2005). One explanation lies in the potential for some accommodative market
equilibrium whereby drug companies accept a certain degree of PT (Ganslandt and Maskus
2004). Alternative explanations rest on the role of incentives resulting from country-specific
regulations, andmore specifically heterogeneous price regulations across countries in a single
market such as the European one. In the pharmaceuticals sector, and despite Europe being an
integrated market, regulatory interventions continue to take place at the national level, which
applies both to the product price and to distribution margins (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005).
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However, for arbitrage to take place, themarket size of the source country needs should suffice
to carry on the activity without leading to major shortages in the source country. Hence, the
larger a particular market, the more attractive it is for both pharmaceutical manufacturers and
parallel distributors to undertake production and trade respectively.
In most European countries, medicines are funded by a single payer (national health
insurance or social insurance fund) who negotiates rates and purchases drugs on the countries
behalf.. Hence, medicine prices in each country are not the result of market mechanisms,
but some form of price regulation and bargaining. In addition, medicines are subject to
regulation setting statutory distribution margins across Europe, and the most widely used
model of distribution involves the manufacturer selling to the wholesaler and the latter to a
retailer (pharmacy) with different degrees of vertical integration across countries. Assuming
that payers regulate medicine prices as in Pecorino (2002) then, ceteris paribus, the larger the
country market size, the higher the potential bargaining power of the health insurers (payers).
Manufacturersmay follow a dual strategy in this case: they can either deter parallel imports
by setting a sufficiently low (high) price in a high (low) price country such that itwouldmake it
unprofitable to performparallel imports; or, alternatively, they canaccommodateparallel trade
simply by allowing parallel distribution to take place without necessarily taking action on
prices. When arbitrage is unlimited then deterrence is more profitable than accommodation.
Conversely, accommodation emerges when the potential volume of arbitrage is small and
trade costs are relatively high (Ganslandt andMaskus 2004)4. However, the distribution chain
regulation is not typically taken into consideration in previous studies despite PT is an activity
that takes place at the distribution level.
An empirical specification
Parallel imports can be empirically modelled, as any form of cross-country flow, using a
gravity specification. The latter is widely used as a baseline model for estimating the impact
of a variety of policy issues related to regional trading groups, currency unions and various
trade distortions (Bougheas et al. 1999; Glink and Rose 2002). Gravity specifications can
be expanded to incorporate both demand and supply factors specific of the pharmaceutical
industry. A basic gravity specification would assume that a flow of goods (e.g., parallel traded
medicines in our case) between two locations is positively related ceteris paribus to the size
of the market (and income levels) and negatively related to the distance between them5. In
our exercise, rather than structurally estimating the parameters of the gravity model, we aim
at testing (in a reduced form) the significance of the parameters that are typically associated
with trade flows, as well as those driving both common and regulatory arbitrage.
We assume parallel distributors aim at maximising an expected profit function, and hence
are more likely to source products to both high price and high statutory distribution margin
countries relative to the prices and distribution margins of the source countries. Given that
the relevant price for parallel imported medicines is the wholesale price prevailing in any of
the countries in question, parallel import prices depend, on a number of parameters related to
drug distributors. The first is the nature of competition prevailing in thewholesale distribution
4 Given that the distribution of medicines is heavily regulated across European countries, parallel imports
might well result from the lack of total vertical control in the pharmaceutical distribution chain by the manu-
facturer.
5 A structural gravitymodel could arise from aCESpreferences and increasing returns to scale. In that context,
distance can be related to transport costs and operates like a relative price, with a coefficient (elasticity) of unity
in most cases. GDP (market size) variables are there to account for importer demand and exporter capacity
and both should have positive coefficients.
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business,which canbeproxied by the number ofwholesalers. Therefore, the research question
our empirical strategy tries to address is that of empirically ascertainingwhether parallel trade
is any different from common arbitrage. More specifically, we will examine whether parallel
imports are determined by the difference in wholesale margins across countries.
Our empirical strategy departs from a naïve pooled cross-sectional specification (OLS)
and then expands it by taking into account the endogeneous determination of parallel imports
and prices (2SLS). Then,we employ panel data techniques to offer amore robust specification
that controls for potential unobservables that explain the correlation between observations for
the same country (2SGLS). Our empirical strategy raises a number of econometric issues:
namely, the inclusion of specific product fixed effects, given that gravity models do not
typically allow for them. The second challenge lies in the limited variability in the regulation
of medicines margins across time. To account for such effects we explore both pool and panel
data specification possibilities. An augmented logarithmic version of the traditional gravity
equation includes a number of controls as follows:
log
(
Mi jt
) = β0 + β1 log
(
Pi
Pj
)
+ β2τi j + β3
(
Zi jt
) + β4Xi jt + β5ζi j t + εi j t
Zi j t =
[
γ1 log
((
GDPit + GDPjt
)) + γ2 log
((
Yit − Y jt
))
+γ3(1 −
(
GDPit
GDPit + GDPit
)2
_
(
GDPjt
GDPit + GDPit
)2]
Xi jt =
[
θ1 log
((
Qit + Q jt
)) + θ2 log
((
wi
w j
))]
(1)
where i and j denote origin and destination country respectively. The error term εi j captures
any other unobserved features that may affect bilateral trade between the two countries.
Gravity-specific determinants are geographical distance (τi j ) the exchange rate (ζi j t ) and
a number of other determinants
(
Zi jt
)
including bilateral sum of GDP of the two trading
countries, the difference between GDP per capita of the two trading countries
(
Yi − Y j
)
, the
relative country size. Given that parallel trade is theoretically conceptualised as a specific
type of arbitrage (Ganslandt and Maskus 2004), it is arguably driven by the existence of a
difference in relative prices between the two countries PiPj . Finally, a number of key controls
are included in Xi j . These include the relative margins of wholesalers in country i with
respect to country j ( wi
w j
) and a volume effect in the form of total drugs from the specific
therapeutic group of interest Qit + Q jt . Finally, β denotes the vector of coefficients for each
variable and εi j measures the set of other influences on bilateral parallel imports which are
part of the error term. Table 2 contains the lits of variables.
Data and empirical strategy
We use data from the Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) database, which contain
quarterly records on import sales and units over the 1997–2002 periods for a set of products
that fall in the therapeutic product category of statins and exhibit parallel trade during the
study period. The gives rise to a total sample size of 768 observations. However, due to
the presence of some missing observations we were left with a final full sample of 625 for
all variables. The data exhibits a three-way panel structure, 4 products 8 exporters to the
Netherlands, in 24 quarters. Data for each product were made available at dispensation level.
IMS collect data on prices and sales for a number of countries, including the Netherlands, and
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Fig. 1 Market share of parallel imported statins in the Netherlands, 1997–2006. Note The figure reports the
proportion of total parallel trade volume as a proportion of total volume of statins in the Netherlands for the
period 1997–2002 (where we observed the origin of parallel trade) and 2003–2006 (where we only observe
the the total volume but we could not identify the origin).it Source: The authors from IMS (2004)
for the selected product group, statins, on a product-by-product (e.g. simvastatin, pravastatin,
etc) and product presentation basis (e.g. simvastatin, 20 mg, 28 tablets). The accuracy of the
data sources has been validated externally (IMS 2004). Data on both wholesale margin and
regulation was obtained from publicly available sources for each country Ministry of Health.
Rather than relying in different therapeutic groups, which are subject to different degrees of
competition and the presence of generic competitors, we instead rely on a single therapeutic
group (statins) which accounts for a significant proportion of total retail sales of prescription
only medicines in European countries (5.7% in 2002) (see Fig. 1).
Statins are products that lower levels of LDL (“bad”) cholesterol by 30–50%, and have
been popularly prescribed to prevent coronary heart disease (CHD), including myocardial
infarction (MI), and their use has been increasing over time, making them, in turn, desirable
targets for parallel trade. All products within the group were protected by a patent during
the study period, therefore, the effect of parallel trade could be isolated from other effects,
such as competition from generic equivalents, and studied without having to account for
the competition effect due to generic penetration (Frank and Salkever 1991; Grabowski and
Vernon 1992; Ganslandt and Maskus 2004).
Table 1 illustrates the difference in statutory margins and competition (number of compa-
nies) in the product distribution of each country. We report the number of competitors in the
source country used to instrument distribution prices, as it is unlikely to affect the quantity
of imports in any other way but though its effect on product prices. This is important for our
instrumentation strategy below. Overall, Table 1 suggests marked differences in the regula-
tion of prices and the wholesaling competitive conditions across European countries. We find
that in France, wholesaler margins are the lowest in the period of analysis, which is consistent
with France being themain source country of parallel importedmedicines to the Netherlands.
Similarly, we find Southern European countries exhibit a significantly higher fragmentation
in their wholesaling and retailing practices compared to other European countries.
An important feature to note is that we were able to identify the price and volume of
each product at any point in time. The dependent variable is the logarithm of imports of
statins into the Netherlands. First, we use the basic specification and consider the impact of
core explanatory variables such as GDP, population and distance. Subsequently, in line with
recent theoretical developments (Egger 2002), we include variables measuring the size of
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Table 2 Variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Abbreviation Description Mean
(SE)
Dependent variable
log
(
Mi jt
)
lquantity Bilateral trade flow volumes of statins (logs) a 1.513
(2.646)
Entry Entry Dummy variable measuring the entry of a
new drug in the parallel trade marketa
0.283
(0.450)
(a) Gravity model controls
τi j Ldist Euclidean distance of latitude and longitude
(in logs) of the country capitals
6.467
(0.941)
log
((
GDPit + GDPjt
))
lG Bilateral sum of GDPs (logs)b 10.782
(0.107)
(b) Trade specification controls
ζi j t Ler Exchange rates in euros (logs)
b 0.0679
(0.102)
log
(
Yit − Y jt
)
labsR Difference of per capita GDPs (absolute terms
and logs)b (N=population)
0.949
(0.618)
(c) Demand and capacity controls
log
((
Qit + Q jt
))
lsumst Sum of total sales of statins (logs)a 11.494
(0.608)
1 −
(
GDPi t
GDPi t+GDPi t
)2
_
(
GDP j t
GDPi t+GDPi t
)2
lS Relative country size (logs)b −0.711
(0.247)
Treatment variables
log
(
Pi
Pj
)
lrelP Relative price between Netherlands and
source country adjusted by defined daily
doses (DDD)a
−0.359
(0.436)
log
((
wi
w j
))
lrelMWS Relative statutory distribution margins (logs)c −0.518
(0.296)
This table provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in the study. The two dependent
variables refer to the volume of parallel imported Medicines and the probability of entry for each product and
time. Our treatment variables include (i) relative official wholesale difference in (regulated) margins between
importing and exporting country exclusive of informal rebates (‘regulated arbitrage’), and the (ii) product price
difference between importing and exporting countries (‘common arbitrage’). Finally, we consider a number
of controls that can be classified as follows: (a) those that derive from a gravity equation of trade such as
distance and bilateral sum of GDPs which should decrease and increase respectively the probability of trade.
(b) Relative country size which explains the capacity of being a parallel exporter without producing major
product shortages. (c) The size of the statin market which measures the demand for statins overall (sum of
total sales of statins). (d) Income differences across countries and exchange rates with the euro which would
be expected to respectively increase and decrease respectively the volume of trade. Export Country (i), Import
County (j) and time (t)
Sources: a IMS data 1997–2002
b OECD Economic Outlook data 1997–2002
c EFPIA, several years (www.efpia.org)
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trading countries and other barriers that might explain the development of parallel trade such
as distance and exchange rates.
Although the influence of price differences on parallel imports to the Netherlands is con-
sistent with the presence of both the common and regulatory arbitrage; the significance of
differences in statutory distribution margins provides cleaner evidence of ‘regulatory arbi-
trage’. The only downside is that, as reported elsewhere (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005),
some of the gains from parallel trade are invisible because of the incentive structures of
different stakeholders are influenced by rebates and informal discounts.
We first report the results of a pooled cross-section specification purely for comparative
purposes it as relies on implausible assumptions (e.g., the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity resulting from unobserved characteristics related to bilateral trade relationships).
Then, we show the estimates of a panel data specification including country-pair “individ-
ual” effects, which partially account for the clustered nature of the data and hence, captures
some of the existing unobserved heterogeneity. The panel specification refers to a generalised
least squares (GLS) model with random effects consistent with the gravity specification out-
lined above whereby some variables are country-specific (e.g. distance) and does not allow
country fixed effects. The interpretation of such a specification is that a country would export
different volume of the same product to two other countries, even if their GDPs are identical
and they are equidistant from the exporting country. This is due to potential differences in
drug regulation, which affect prices and margins, and hence gains from PT.
We then estimate both two stage least squares (2SLS) and two stage generalised least
squares (2SGLS) models to account for the endogenenity of price differences and the panel
structure of the data. To instrument price differences, we are able to observe the variability
in the competitive conditions in the drug distribution in the source country which we do not
expect it would affect the volume of parallel traded product though other mechanisms but
prices. Specifically, we use the relative number of wholesalers as an instrument for product
price at the wholesale level. Given that prices are regulated, one would not expect they would
conflate with direct price regulation in some countries (e.g., some countries might have free
drug pricing and regulate heavily the margins of pharmaceutical distributors). We test and
confirm the existence of endogeneity in the price formation, and the statistical validity of the
instrument with the common F-test.
The variables employed in the analysis are presented in Table 2 and are reported as
follows: (a) the observed volume of each statin imported into the Netherlands from another
EU country; (b) the distance between two countries defined as the Euclidean distance of
latitude and longitude between country capitals; the reason for measuring distance in this
way rests on the fact that kilometers are not necessarily a good approximation for transport
costs given alternative and more direct ways of transportation (e.g. air travel); (c) exchange
rate is an obvious determinant of parallel imports insofar as it impacts price transparency
(given that not all countries examined are in the euro area and the period examined corresponds
to before the euro was introduced), especially in the context of European integration.; (d)
following the predictions of a gravity model, our model includes the bilateral sum of country
GDPs (in logs) ln
(
GDPit + GDPjt
)
, as it is conventional in the literature we measure
relative country size (in logs), the difference of GDP per capita (in logs), and the sum of
statins sales in e (in logs) that is the specific therapeutic group in question which has been
growing in size during the study period which were included after testing for colinearity in
the regression; (e) furthermore, we consider the point of entry of a parallel imported drug
or product presentation. As expected from a model of arbitrage, relative prices between
countries (in logs) should be a key determinant, with a negative expected sign. Finally, (g)
a set of variables has been added to measure the aggregate number of distributors, which
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accounts for the degree of competition in the distribution chain in both countries proxied by
the relative number of wholesalers in the Netherlands and the exporting country and the (h)
relative wholesaler and account for possible economic incentives for parallel trade which are
exogenous proxies for regulations.
Results
Preliminary evidence
Webegin our empirical examination by reporting descriptive evidence of trends in the parallel
import penetration and establish some stylised facts that will guide our regression strategy.
Specifically, Fig. 2 shows a monotonic penetration of parallel imported medicines to the
Netherlands after 1999. Whilst this evidence is initially attributable to a single product
(simvastatin), subsequently, it exhibits a comparable pattern for other competitor statins.
According to IMS, the market shares of parallel imported statins were about 30% over the
study period, which suggest that the Netherlands is, compared to other European countries,
one of the most dynamic parallel importers.
Figure 3 reports PT trends by country of origin. Importantly, the most common country
of origin of parallel imported drugs in the Netherlands, at least in the earlier parts of the
study period, was France. This is result cannot be explained by price differences alone
given that France does not exhibit the lowest price among exporting countries. In contrast,
France does exhibit the lowest statutory distribution margins in the period of analysis. In
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Atorvastatin Simvastatin Fluvastatin Pravastatin Total
Fig. 2 Parallel trade penetration of statins in the Netherlands (parallel imports as a % of total product market),
1997–2002. Note This figure reports (for each specific products that ate included in the statins therapeutic
group) the penetration of parallel trade defined as the ratio of parallel traded volume and total volume in
percentage terms. it Source: The authors from IMS (2004)
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Fig. 3 Proportional (%) origin of parallel imported statins in the Netherlands, 1997–2002. Note This figure
displays for each year of the study 1997–2002 the proportion of parallel trade sales of statins in the Netherlands
per country of origin. it Source: The authors from IMS (2004)
addition, the relative large size of the French market allows some distribution to be shifted
without compromising toomuchmedicines availability. Finally, and consistent with a gravity
specification, France is, together with Belgium, the closest geographical neighbour to the
Netherlands.
Importantly, the evidence presented in Fig. 3 suggests that although 90% of parallel
imported statins into the Netherlands were sourced from France in 1997, Spain’s market
share has increased significantly since 2000. By 2002 Spanish exports accounted for 40% of
all statins parallel imported into the Netherlands.
Econometric results
This section reports the econometric estimates of a number of gravity specifications following
the premises of equation (1), which they will allow us to identify the influence of economic
versus regulatory determinants of parallel import entry and penetration. Appendix 2 provides
the definition of the variables employed and how they link to equation 1. Purely for compar-
ative purposes, Table 3 provides the estimates of a pooled OLS specification, alongside with
two stage least squares (2SLS) and two-stage generalised least squares (2SGLS) estimates.
Given the panel nature of the data, we cluster our observations by both country of origin and
product. Yet, as the observations are not independently clustered, our preferred specification
is that of a GLSmodel that accounts for alternative distributional assumptions. The treatment
variables in the specification refer to both the relative price differences between importing
and exporting countries and the difference in regulatory margins which influence the whole-
salers decision to source to other countries through PT. Accordingly, we include as a key
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Table 3 Augmented gravity equation estimates (OLS and 2SLS) dependent variable: bilateral parallel trade
flows to the Netherlands (in Mit )
∗
OLS (3.1) 2SLS (3.2) 2SGLS – RE (3.3)
Coeff Coeff Coeff
(SE) (SE) (SE)
lrelMWS −0.969 −1.754c −1.643a
(0.719) (0.935) (0.536)
lrelP −0.501 4.012a 3.458b
(0.306) (1.059) (1.671)
ldist 1.809a 5.877b 6.564
(0.263) (2.939) (4.951)
ler −1.638 −7.042b −2.225
(1.683) (3.068) (9.129)
lG −11.90a −15.815a 12.690a
(3.384) (5.027) (3.58)
lS 145.798a 193.058a 77.845a
(18.978) (34.457) (23.38)
labsR −4.278a −5.067a −1.176
(0.742) (1.091) (1.255)
lsumst 3.164a 3.852a −1.798b
(0.638) (0.896) (0.717)
Intercept 188.991 245.661a −78.49
(40.584) (62.091) (37.979)
R2 (adjusted) 0.15
N (observations 625 610 610
Wald χ28 (∇βi = 0) 82.33 57.38
* Restricted to molecules where there is some evidence of parallel trade.
a Denotes significance at 1% level
b Denotes significance at 5% level, and estimates contain robust standard errors
covariate the statutory distribution margins difference to measure the effect of competitive
conditions in the drug distribution system.
Most variables reveal the expected coefficients, specifically we divide the variables
between treatment variables including statutory margins and price differences measuring
the effect of common and regulatory arbitrage as defined in Table 2, and those variables that
can be labelled as controls. The difference between different controls lies in that some are
covariates specific of a gravity specification (distance and country mass), other are economic
controls such as (income and exchange rates) which are commonly associated with trade
volume, and finally we include other variables specific of the arbitrage activity (demand for
statins proxied by the total market and the country size).
Endogeneity tests (Wooldridge 2010) suggest unambiguous evidence of endogeneity of
price differences. (we can reject the hypothesis of exogeneity) Accordingly, we have instru-
mented the price differences using data on the relative number ofwholesalers across countries.
The theoretical justification for including these instruments lies in the fact that they are
strongly associated with the formation of prices given that statutory margins are responsi-
ble for the formation of final prices but one would not expect them to influence volume
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directly. An instrumental variable (IV) estimation should provide a consistent estimate of the
coefficients of interest and correct for any omitted variable bias (Angrist and Krueger 2001).
Estimates reported in Table 3 are for the most part consistent with expectations. We find
that barriers to trade—such as exchange rates—exhibit the expected (negative) effects on
parallel imports6. Table 3 reports the results of a gravity equation specification estimated
using OLS, 2SLS and 2SGLS. The logic of the latter specification rests on the assumption
that, country- and product-specific effects might be driving the dynamics of parallel import
flows. Fixed effects would not be consistent with a model including distance so we rely on
random effects. We considered estimating the model using country of origin fixed effects,
however two of the most relevant variables could not then be included in the specification.
Hence, we have decided not to pursue such strategy.
Table 3 suggests that some of the common determinants of trade do not apply to parallel
imports. Indeed, transport costsmight turn out to be less robust and not statistically significant.
However, the estimate difference between 2SLS and OLS estimates with regards to the effect
of relative prices and wholesale margins is suggestive of the presence of unobservables
and other confounder effects biasing our results. Specifically, GLS estimates suggest that in
addition to pure price differences (elasticity of 3.4 of a unit difference in relative prices),
the effect of distribution margins remains significant consistently with the hypothesis of
regulatory arbitrage. Our preferred specification is consistent with expectations with regards
to the gravity model (positive effect of combined economic mass (GDP) but no effect of
country distance), a higher demand for statins would reduce the volume of parallel imports
whilst country size is expected to produce the opposite effects on trade. Table 4 in the
Appendix provides comparable regression results to predict the entry in the parallel trade
market, and suggests that the same regulatory variables explain the decision to enter the
market.
An important picture comes out of such a strategy. Consistently with PT as a form of regu-
latory arbitrage, medicine price differences which (are set mainly by government regulation)
exert a significant effect in explaining parallel trade volume, but a large proportion of parallel
import flows are driven by changes statutory distribution margins between the Netherlands
and source countries in line with the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis. The effect size of the
difference in wholesale margin compares to that of a change in total volume of statins, which
we use here to proxy product demand.
Conclusion
We have empirically examined the hypothesis of PT being a type of regulatory arbitrage that
takes place at the medicines distribution level. We have studied the combined influence of
both distribution chain and price regulation in driving PTflows drawing fromunique data (that
includes source country information, and hence allows estimating the effect of both specific
price differences and cross-country statutory margins). Our dataset is from the Netherlands
(a country that ranks among the highest parallel importers) and for one therapeutic group:
statins (a therapeutic group subject to patent protection during the period of analysis and not
affected by generic entry). We specifically examine the influence of differences in both price
and statutory margins between the Netherlands and country of origin countries in driving
parallel trade flows.
6 This has to dowith the fact that in some parallel exporter countries such as Spain and France the introduction
of the euro has eliminated the exchange rate variability with the Netherlands
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Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of parallel trade in Europe being indeed a
regulation-induced phenomenon, which we refer to as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. That is, we find
that changes in the statuary margins across countries afford incentives for the development
of parallel distribution channels. Hence, even if all European countries were not to regulate
medicines prices, there could still be some potential for PT driven by differences in statutory
distribution margins. Nonetheless, our results need to inevitably be taken with caution as
they rely on only one therapeutic group, and refer to a period where the European Union was
restricted to 15 members. One would expect differences in the nature of the activity in an
enlarged Europe.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
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Appendix 1
See Table 4.
Table 4 Entry (Probit)
Dependent variable: 1 refer to the
existence of some trade flows to
the Netherlands (in Mit )
∗
* Restricted to molecules where
there is some evidence of parallel
trade.
a Denotes significance at 1%
level
b Denotes significance at 5%
level, estimates contain robust
standard errors
Entry (Probit)
Coeff SE
Ldist 0.999a
(0.148)
lrelP 0.386b
(0.159)
Ler −0.255
(0.869)
lG −3.663b
(1.856)
lS 74.108a
(12.383)
labsR −2.209a
(0.419)
Lsumst 1.223a
(0.347)
lrelMWS −0.458b
(0.202)
Intercept 72.694
(23.547)
R2 (adjusted)
N (No. of observations) 625
Pseudo R2 0.13
Likelihood ratio χ28 91.29
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Appendix 2: Variable description
Bilateral trade flow volume lquantity
Distance ldist
Exchange rate ler
Entry entry
LabsR . Referes to the difference of log of GDPpc between export and import country, rep-
resenting a proxy for country’s relative factor endowment. The smaller the difference, the
more intra-industry trade and the lower inter-industry trade. Expected sign: negative
Ri jt =
∣
∣
∣
∣log
(
GDPi t
Nit
)
− log
(
GDP j t
N jt
)∣∣
∣
∣
Following Egger (2000)
– lG is the Bilateral sum of GDP: the larger the overall economic space, the larger trade
between these two countries. Expected sign: positive
Gi jt = log
(
GDPi t + GDP j t
)
– lS is the Relative country size: the larger the measure, the more similar the two countries
in terms of GDP, and therefore, the more intra-industry trade. Expected sign: positive
Si j t = log
(
1 −
(
GDPi t
GDPi t + GDP j t
)2
−
(
GDP j i
GDPi t + GDP j t
)2)
lsumst refers to the Sum of total sales of statins (log). Expected sign: positive
ln(Qi + Qj)
The logic of a additive specification would be that the number of sales stand out as a proxy
for market size.
lrelWS refers to the relative number of wholesalers as an IV for price difference. IV
Expected sign: positive
– We are interested in the relative number of wholesalers between the two countries, since
the higher and positive the difference, the more parallel trade will take place.
lrelP is the relative price between Netherlands and source country. Expected sign: negative.
A high ratio between pi and pj means that pi is much larger than pj, therefore, the higher the
price in export country, the lower the parallel trade.
Ln(pi/pj)
lrelMWS is the relative price between WS margins in export and import country. Expected
sign: negative. A high ratio between wholesalers margins export and import country means
that wholesalers margin is much larger in export country, therefore, the higher the margin in
export country, the lower the parallel trade.
Same logic as price difference.
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